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Fats and Spirits: A Story of Modern Humanities’ Energy Dependence
Dan Tamïr1
Abstract
While  warnings  about  a  crisis  in  the  humanities  have  often  been  heard  in  the  past  two
decades, little attention has hitherto been given to the connection between the current situation
in the humanities and the energetic regime allowing their pursuit. This chapter examines the
relation  between  the  social  ability  to  dedicate  time  and  resources  to  scholarship  in  the
humanities,  and the availability  of energy. Its  main argument is  that  the blooming of the
humanities during the 19th and 20th centuries was tightly related to the great abundance of
cheap fossil fuels – coal, gas, and, most significantly, petroleum – which sparked ‘growth’ in
many aspects  of  human life,  the  humanities  included.  The humanities  represent  a  human
occupation which is not aimed at immediate gains or the satisfaction of the most basic needs;
therefore, they have been among the first to suffer due to the declining availability of cheap
and easy-to-get energy in the past decades. Dwindling resources and threats brought upon by
greenhouse gas emissions are now putting an end to the modern flourishing of the humanities,
which will need social, economic, and political supporting mechanisms different from those
which have been supporting them for the past two centuries.
Keywords  Economic  growth;  Scholarship;  Industrial  Revolution;  Fossil  fuels;  Petroleum;
Peak oil; Dependence
3.1 Introduction
The widespread idea of a crisis  in the humanities  – and in  scholarship and non-technical
knowledge in general – is hardly secret. A feeling of a deterioration of the humanities (and, to
a lesser extent, the ‘softʼ social sciences) has been around for decades (see, e.g., Bloom 1987).
More recently, declarations about a “Silent Crisis” in the study of the humanities, damaging
the basis of liberal democratic modern societies (Nussbaum 2016, p. 2) are loud and clear.
Some, however, characterise the current situation in the humanities not as a crisis but rather as
“an  ongoing  set  of  problems”,  perceiving  it  less  as  an  immediate  threat  and  more  as  a
structural  phenomenon  (Donoghue  2010,  p.  1).  Either  way,  a  notion  of  decline  and
deterioration – culturally and politically – has accompanied those working in and with the
humanities for quite a while; while the loudest voices surrounding it seem to stem from that
part of North America between Canada and Mexico, the trend – differing in its intensity and
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form – is  not  limited  to  that  region.  This  chapter  argues  that  the current  situation in  the
humanities has an energy aspect, which should not be overlooked. 
What are the ‘humanities’? The exact definition of the term in its scholarly context is not
an easy one, as some small differences exist between its usage in various academic traditions.
In English, the  Oxford Dictionary defines the humanities as “the subjects of study that are
about  the  way  people  think  and  behave,  for  example  literature,  language,  history  and
philosophy” (Humanity 2020b).  Merriam-Webster reiterates this definition as “the branches
of learning – such as philosophy, arts, or languages – that investigate human constructs and
concerns”, as opposed to “natural processes (as in physics or chemistry) and social relations
(as in anthropology or economics)”  (Humanity 2020a).  In French, the  Larousse describes
“human  sciences”  as  “disciplines  whose object  [of  research]  is  the  human being  and his
individual and collective behaviours, in the past and in the present” (Sciences 2020, [n.p.]).
Accordingly, in the French-speaking sphere, the differentiation between “natural sciences”,
“life sciences”, “social sciences”, and “human sciences” is a common one, even though the
borders between the human and the social may be blurred. A similar definition prevails in
German, where the Duden defines “Geisteswissenschaft” (literally: the sciences of the spirit)
as “the entirety of the sciences whose object  is the various fields of [human] culture and
intellectual life” (Geisteswissenschaft 2020); the German academy, though, has traditionally
merged under this definition also what we today call ‘social sciencesʼ. 
Altogether, under ‘humanities’ we can understand the research and the investigation of
phenomena conducted, construed, or contrived by humans, as opposed to other animals or
forces of nature. It is a human endeavour focused on the inner individual or social self, not the
practical  production of anything nor immediate gain.  These definitions  of the humanities,
however, have a contemporary twist: in an era when humans influence the fundamentals of an
entire planet to the degree of modifying entire ecosystems, changing the Earth’s atmosphere
and climate, is not everything on our planet an object of human agency? Indeed, our era of all-
encompassing human influence named the Anthropocene (Crutzen & Stoermer 2000), might
be changing the essence of the humanities, or at least the way we perceive them: if everything
in our world is influenced by human action, then everything may be considered as part of the
humanities. It is not surprising, therefore, that the field of environmental humanities is gaining
ground,  encouraging  humanists  to  look  at  the  entire  world  as  relevant  to  the  human
experience, and seek the human experience in all parts and aspects of our environment (Holm
et al. 2015). As we shall see, however, even the most theoretical and non-material pursuit of
the humanities has energetic dependencies; the humanities, in other words, have an energetic
history of their own. 
However,  ‘history of  the  humanitiesʼ  is  not  a  common token and its  study is  not  as
established a field as the history of the natural sciences, to the degree that some assert that the
humanities completely “lack a general history” (Bod 2013, p. 1). Such a decisive assertion
might sound as a bit of an over-exclamation, but it is true that a ‘mainstream’, general and
agreed upon history of  the  humanities  is  not  common knowledge.  The lack  of  a  general
history  of  the  humanities  stands  in  clear  contrast  with  the  abundance  of  modern  natural
science  in  various  world  histories  (see,  e.g.,  Bynum 2012;  DeWitt  2010;  Gribbin  2010):
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whereas a ‘history of science’ is a common thing,  a ‘history of the humanities’  is  hardly
existent. 
One  appealing  explanation  for  the  lack  in  humanities  history  is  the  increased
fragmentation which has gradually been taking place within the humanities during the past
200 years,  a  fragmentation  which  seems as  an opposite  move  to the  search  for  unifying
theories  guiding the  natural  sciences,  at  least  as  their  desired  outcome,  if  not  their  daily
practice (Bod 2013, p. 4). A second explanation or a general reason for this lack may be that
hitherto very little research has been conducted on the relationship between the humanities –
which are usually associated with intellect and spirit – and their physical environment. While
the connection between the natural sciences and the surrounding physical environment seems
to go without saying, the connection between the humanities and the environment seems less
obvious. 
This historiographical lack has multiple faces, but a part of it is the lack of a history of the
connection between the humans’ occupation with the humanities and the physical resources
available to them, which enable the mere existence of that pursuit of knowledge. Energy – the
basis of our physical existence and activity – is a good place to start filling this gap between
spiritual contemplation and physical existence: the ‘energy humanitiesʼ can be perceived as a
field  of  scholarship  that  overcomes  the  boundaries  between  disciplines,  and  between
academic and applied research, highlighting the essential contribution that the insights and
methods  of  the  human  sciences  can  make  to  areas  of  study and analysis  that  were  once
thought best left to the natural sciences (Boyer & Szeman 2014). 
The aim of this chapter is to draw a very brief description of the relations between energy
and the study of the humanities during the past few centuries (a time period marked by a deep
schism with its  energetic  past),  sketch an outline for our contemporary humanities-energy
nexus and crisis – a crisis made up of a combination of the unwanted consequences of the use
of fossil fuels and the dwindling of some of them – and finally suggest some foundations for a
future agenda for the humanities, based on the threats our current energetic situation poses
and the opportunities it creates. This chapter takes a point of view not from the humanities
towards energy, but rather from energy towards the humanities: it first provides a short review
of humanity’s longue durée energetic history, focusing on the shift from the old regime to the
new  one.  After  defining  and  analysing  the  significance  of  the  different  phases  in  the
development of the new energy regime, it shows how that material energetic development
enabled  and shaped  the  development  of  the  humanities  in  academia  during  the  past  two
decades. It then suggests that the current crisis in the exploitation of fossil fuels is now once
again reshaping academia in general and the humanities in particular (partially taking these
back to the place they had before the era of fossils). Finally, the chapter portrays a possible
vision of a future for the humanities,  based on the current global energy situation and the
world’s predicted energetic future.
3.2 Energy and Human Endeavour
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Like any human activity, research and teaching are bound to various forces influencing and
shaping human societies. These forces are social, political, ideological – and material. Thus,
depending and relying on ideas, innovation, cognition, and spiritual and mental efforts as she
may  be,  academia  still  requires  material  infrastructure  and  resources  in  order  to  sustain
herself.  While  the  joke  about  the  history  professor  who  needs  nothing  but  books  and  a
computer,  and  the  philosophy  professor  who  does  not  even  need  a  computer  is  an
exaggeration, it is true that the material demands of the humanities are considerably lower
compared  with  those  of  the  natural  sciences,  which  require  laboratories,  consumable
materials,  large  spaces,  machinery,  and  further  infrastructure.  However,  pursuing  the
humanities  still  requires  a  certain amount of real,  tangible  matter.  This  includes  not  only
books,  journal  subscriptions,  access  to  archives,  computers,  pencils,  desks,  and  travel
mechanisms, but the entire complex system which allows people to engage in and devote
themselves to scholarly work which does not yield immediate results or gains. Even ascetic
philosophers and extreme theoreticians must eat something every now and then, and keep
their studios, rooms, and offices warm during cold winter nights. In short: they are humans
and everything they do requires energy.   
Like all other living creatures, humans rely on external energy sources in order to exist
and act. Furthermore, as social animals, humans do not act only as individuals: this means that
all human societies can therefore be seen as systems aimed at collecting energy available from
various sources, processing and re-distributing it through various social mechanisms which
may describe society. The amount and kind of energy available to a society are two factors
which define the framework within which social  processes can take place.  Therefore,  the
analysis  of  historical  energy  flows  provides  an  explanation  –  not  a  unique  or  single
explanation, but still a valid one – for the basic patterns of different social formations and
actions (Crosby 2006).
3.3 Different ‘energy regimes’ 
The energy history of humanity may be divided roughly into two eras, based on two energetic
regimes: the ‘old regime’ and the ‘new regime’. The ‘old regime’ is based on the annually
renewable energy deriving from the sun, from direct radiation to subsidiary kinds of energy,
such as wind, the flow of rivers, and the organic material accumulated in plants during the
process of photosynthesis, which is possible thanks to sunlight. The ‘old’ regime was – and
still is, in many parts of the world – based on the annual radiation of the sun, giving modest
energetic gains for every action made by humans and allowing only little accumulation of
energy and wealth in both time and space.
The ‘new regime’ also involves fossil fuels (Burke 2009; Sieferle 2001, pp. 4-34). While
the temporal distinction between the two is not clear-cut (they still co-exist in various parts of
the  world),  the  ‘new regime’  is  actually  defining  the  modern  world  as  the  basis  for  our
contemporary modern industrial  civilization.  Nuclear energy is another feature of the new
regime,  whereas  energy  from  renewable  sources  is  additional  to  the  fossils,  not  their
replacement (a total replacement of fossils by renewable sources in the future may signal the
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beginning of a new era). The new regime can be further subdivided in accordance with the
three main fossil fuels humans use: coal, gas, and petroleum. 
Energy is absolutely necessary not only to modern societies (Szeman & Boyer 2017), but
to any society, be it modern or not. However, without the forms and quantities of energy to
which we have access and which we now take for granted, industrialisation and modernity
would never had existed: the modern (and Northern-dominated) world came to be what it is
today thanks to the broad and intensive use of fossil  energy. As part  of the entire human
endeavour, the development of the humanities during the past two centuries is tightly bound
with the technical achievements of the new energy regime during that same period. In the
19th century, modern societies moved from using human and animal labour to using fossil
fuels. This transition was what made them industrial and modern. 
This  energetic  development  was  not  straightforward,  and  included  several  phases,
generally parallel to the finding, adoption, and implementation of new fossil fuels: from the
beginning of the use of coal during the early 19th century, through the switch from coal to
petroleum, and to the great acceleration of the 1950s – the rapid increase in the growth of
every material aspect of human life, from food to transportation and from textile manufacture
to radio programmes, also known as the ‘1950s Syndrome’ – due to new oil discoveries and
improved extraction and combustion technologies  (Crosby 2006; Pfister 1996; Steffen et al.
2015).  Like other  intellectual  occupations,  the humanities  were also part  of this,  as these
phases are parallel to the blooming of new universities and faculties, the establishment of the
Geisteswissenschaften, and then the ‘boom’ in higher education in the industrialised world –
as well as the crisis we are witnessing today.
3.3.1 Modern Times: Coal Makes the ‘New Regimeʼ
Three main fossil fuels are used today. Whereas the broad commercial use of gas began (in
historical terms) just recently, petroleum was available from the late 19th century (Heinberg
2003; Smil 2006). However, it was coal, in broad use from the 18th century, which enabled
the “Great Departure” from an old-world order to a new one (Marks 2007, pp. 189-194). That
shift from renewable solar-cycle energy to fossil energy accumulated in coal had a deep and
wide influence on all  parts and aspects of human life,  from the micro daily schedule and
habits of individuals to the macro political history of the world in the modern era. 
The introduction of coal into human economies had both an immediate, practical, and
quantitative effect and a qualitative,  conceptual one.  Quantitatively,  the past two centuries
stood in the sign of plenty, richness, and an ongoing expectation of material abundance. It is
worthwhile pausing for a moment to grasp and comprehend the huge difference between the
amount of energy currently available to the average citizen in modern industrialised society
and the amount of energy that was available to his/her ancestors about eight generations ago,
in the early 19th century. The amount of energy available to the average human today is twice
as big as the amount of energy that was available to his/her grandparents 60 years ago and
about  four  times  the  amount  of  energy  available  to  their  grandparents  (Smil  2017).  One
outcome of the substitution of human labour with machines was the liberation of a constantly
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growing  percent  of  the  population  in  industrial  societies  from their  age-old  work  in  the
production  of  food and goods,  allowing a growing part  of  the population  to  take  part  in
activities  other  than  supplying  basic  needs  –  such  as  reading,  writing,  and  studying.
Qualitatively, the main conceptual effect induced by that energetic transition was ‘growth’:
the notion that individuals, societies, and even humanity in general are bound to have more
and more available material and energy with every passing period of time. 
Altogether,  the  essence  of  the  coal-based  Industrial  Revolution  was  equipping  each
worker with more energy and capital, thus increasing production and the average income of
the entire population. Soon, people began to expect to be better paid and enjoy the benefits of
leisure and consumption allowed by the new energy regime (Kander et al. 2013, p. 158). It is
exactly this leisure that made the widening of the humanities possible; this widening became
even greater with the mass usage of petroleum. 
3.3.2 The 20th Century: Oil Makes the World Go Round
Although their chemical and natural origins are similar, oil has several operational advantages
over coal and gas. First, unlike coal, which needs to be lifted and shovelled, oil is less bulky,
and can be transported and delivered by tanks, barrels, or small pipelines. It therefore requires
less manpower for extraction, shipping, distribution, and delivery. Oil used to be relatively
easily extracted: during the booming years of cheap, accessible oil, the drilling of oil wells,
the shipping of crude oil, and its final refining demanded a very small investment of energy
and  a  few workers  compared  to  the  inputs  required  to  operate  coal  mines.  Second,  it  is
relatively stable: unlike gas, which has to be well sealed in closed containers, cooled down or
liquified, oil is not likely to diffuse or evaporate when kept in a wide range of temperatures.
Last but not least, oil can be quite easily processed into a variety of different products: from
gasoline  to  plastic  toys,  from  lubricants  to  fertilizers.  Cheap,  flexible,  and  abundant,  it
endowed modern industrial societies with an immense quantity of readily available energy. 
With  these  features  well  established,  no  wonder  that  engines  fuelled  by  petroleum
products became the movers of the 20th century’s global society (Smil 2010, p. 216). Of
course, oil is only one energy source out of many and should not be the only prism of our
energy  research  (Jones  2016).  Yet  today,  oil  presents  society  with  a  large  portfolio  of
problems:  rapid  global  warming;  serious,  world-altering  globalised  environmental  crises
related  to  its  extraction;  increasing  geopolitical  instability  and  armed  conflicts  related  to
control of oil supplies; and, finally, a possibly imminent failure of supply that would deeply
affect the world’s economic and social systems. Oil has become essential to all aspects of
humans’ way of life, from agriculture and healthcare to transportation and consumer goods
(Buell 2012; Heinberg 2003): these are the social systems and infrastructures which support
the pursuit of all scholarship – including the humanities.
And how cheap oil was and still is! A common way of pricing energy – and many other
things  –  is  in  invented  money:  GBP per  unit  of  gas  or  USD per  barrel  of  oil.  Modern
currencies,  however,  are  a  human  imaginary  invention;  the  real price  of  energy  is  the
energetic cost of extracting it: how many units of energy one has to invest in order to extract
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another unit of energy. This is referred to as the Energy Return on Investment, or EROI. For
example, investing 10 calories in a process which grants us 20 calories reflects an EROI of
1:2; investing the energy equivalent of 100 apples in order to get the energy equivalent of
1,000 apples gives an EROI rate of 1:10. 
Measured in EROI, petroleum was an energetic bonanza: at the beginning of the 20th
century, the estimated EROI for petroleum was around 1:100. This ratio declined with time
but was still very profitable during most of that century: in some oil fields during the 1960s,
the energetic return was still around 40. This means that for every unit of energy invested in
drilling, pumping, distilling, and shipping, 40 units of energy were delivered (Murphy & Hall
2010). From the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 21st century, thanks to discoveries of
new oil fields and improving drilling techniques, petroleum was available in ever-growing
quantities. Even if the net return on investment was steadily decreasing, the total amount of
oil extracted continued to grow. This steady growth in energetic inputs easily inspired two
economic thoughts: first, that ‘growth’ is and should be an integral part of modern economy;
second, that this growth can continue on and on (Heinberg 2003).  
3.3.3 Growth and Its Limits 
The sudden availability of fossil fuels – with oil being of central importance among them –
and their growing annual rates of extraction during the 20th century have laid the ground for a
new social and economic order which has – as far as we can tell – no historical precedence.
That order is based on and aimed at ‘growth’; although it is usually referred to as economic
growth, it actually encompasses all parts of life. Supported by the increasing availability of
energy inputs during the 20th century,  growth became  the political  belief  of the late 20th
century.  Although in different facets and within different political contexts, the belief  that
human consumption, population size, and available services can ‘grow’ was shared by both
capitalist and communist societies, liberals and social-democrats – to the degree that some
scholars claim that within the Anthropocene, our era is the era of growth or the Auxocene
(Reichel & Perey 2018). The disputes between different political parties and factions were –
and to a  large extent,  as long as mainstream political  camps stay bound to anachronistic
paradigms, still are – merely about the distribution of accumulated wealth and the way the
pieces of the growing pie should be divided. All believed that the pie was growing and would
continue to grow.
When viewed through the narrow prism of the second half of the 20th century, the global
economy seemed to be growing: every year more oil  was extracted and more energy was
available to humanity. The availability of cheap, abundant fossil fuels was the main force
driving the economic growth since the beginning of the 20th century,  especially from the
1950s onwards (Pfister 1996): more available energy meant more food, more people, more
commodities, more mobility, more of everything manufactured or invented by people, as a
matter of fact (and less of everything else, from rainforests to fish in the sea). However, like
coal and gas, petroleum is a limited, non-renewable resource, which is about to be depleted
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after reaching a ‘peak’ in its extraction (Campbell & Laherrère 1998; Heinberg 2006; Hirsch
2005). And indeed, it is depleting (Chapman 2014; Murray & King 2012). 
Soon, however, this increased economic activity caused by the growing availability of
energy  raised  considerable  criticism  and  scepticism.  During  the  early  1970s,  Nicholas
Georgescu-Roegen (1971; 1977) already pointed out that the material limits of the world in
which humans live do hinder, by definition, future economic growth: infinite consumption
and growth are impossible in a finite world, without external inputs. Therefore, he concluded,
growth will have to end, sooner or later. The best publicly known expression of the initial fear
of exhausting that ‘growth’ was probably the one articulated by the ‘Club of Rome’ – a group
of natural and social scientists, named after the city in which it first congregated  – which
doubted the entire ability of humanity to sustain its economic growth, due to employment
insecurity, environmental degradation, monetary disruptions, rapid changes in traditions, and
the breaking of social institutions (Meadows et al. 1972). All of these reports and critics of the
ruling financial order emphasised our inability to continue growing infinitely in a finite world.
The mainstream media and most of the world’s governments will not admit it, because it is
‘bad newsʼ for our consumer society; but by the beginning of the 21st century, the futility of
the attempts to sustain the unsustainable has become clear (Seidl & Zahrnt 2010).  
3.4 Humanities and Energy Shifts 
Doubtful by their nature as they are and disliked as they ought to be, generalisations are not
always bad; in the case of the old energetic regime and its influence on the humanities, they
may even be useful.  The humanities  have their  history of continuity and change, through
which they neither  stood still  nor stayed frozen in any way: from their  beginnings in the
ancient  world,  through classical  and  medieval  eras,  in  various  places  and various  social,
religious, and political constellations, the humanities changed deeply in their methods, foci,
and social  acceptance,  to  name just  a  few characteristics  of  their  place  in  the  history  of
knowledge and ideas (Bod 2013).  
That being said, the humanities were also part of the energetic surroundings of humanity,
as mentioned above: societies’ ability to allow their members to engage in activities that are
not related to immediate needs is dependent on the amount of  ‘spareʼ energy available to
them. The division between an old and a new energy regime is valid here as well.  For the
purpose of our discussion, here we can assume that the ancient and medieval history of the
humanities  saw relatively  small  and  very  slow changes  during  the  period  until  the  early
modern era: enriching humans’ knowledge about the world and themselves had to do more
with preserving old than creating new knowledge. In societies which relied on human labour
and muscle energy for catering to basic needs (mostly food supply), only a tiny percentage of
the population could engage itself fully with occupations which were not directly related to
physical  work and labour.  In the times before the usage of fossil  fuels,  farmers,  masons,
herders, foresters, and artisans were all needed in large numbers. Only a small percentage of
the population could evade the physical toil and engage in the work of the brain and not of the
body. The Roman admiration for vita contemplativa – as opposed to vita activa – was all but
an  expression  of  that  desire:  probably  shared  by  many  but  accomplished  only  by  few.
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Accordingly, the engagement with the humanities was limited and small in numbers. This is,
of course, not to say that past cultures were less developed or lacked some qualities  that
modern societies have, or that ancient and medieval humanities were of lower grade, but that
the social reach of the humanities, as a distinct faculty of human life, was limited. 
The new energy regime brought a deep change to the history of the humanities. With
their  qualitative  essence  and  role  in  human  societies  well  established,  changes  in  the
humanities at the early stages of the new regime, during the 19th century, were structural and
institutional  rather  than  essential  or  qualitative.  They  included  specialisation  and
professionalisation, the creation of local and national – rather than universal – foundations for
research  in  the  humanities,  and  finally  the  separation  from  the  natural  sciences.  Most
distinctively, new in the 19th century was the academic institutionalisation of disciplines, not
so much the nature of humanistic knowledge as a whole (Bod et al. 2014). 
While the early roots of the aforementioned processes may be traced to the 18th century,
the  later  rise  of  modern  industrial  civilization  accelerated  them considerably.  One of  the
earliest and most commonly cited expressions portraying the specialisation of the humanities
is the one coined by Charles P. Snow, who refers to the humanities and the natural sciences as
‘two cultures’, with a substantial gap between them (1956; 1959). Another chasm portrayed in
Snow’s book (1959) received less attention during the past decades. This is the gap which
developed between the humanities  (and theoretical  scientists  to some degree) and modern
technology.  “If  we forget  the  scientific  culture”,  Snow opines,  “then  the  rest  of  western
intellectuals have never tried,  wanted or been able to understand the industrial revolution,
much less accept it” (1959, p. 23). As a matter of fact, Snow argues, academics had nothing to
do with the Industrial Revolution, for “so far as there was any thinking in nineteenth-century
industry, it was left to cranks and clever workmen” – not to academics and certainly not to
humanists  (ibid.,  p.  25).  The  latter  practically  ‘survived’  through  one  of  the  greatest
transformations humanity had ever seen (second maybe only to the agricultural revolutions
millennia earlier), while benefiting from its amenities. 
Today, when the decreasing returns on energy investments bring the age of expansion
and prosperity to its end, the humanities will no longer be able to join the ride and enjoy the
plenitude as it used to during the past century. The evidence is already clear: during the past
several decades, and increasingly since the 1980s, higher education became an industry to
itself,  as  academic  degrees  and  publications  became  a  commodity  or  consumer  goods,
produced in growing quantities with no direct purpose except the continued operation of the
institutions  and  mechanisms  producing  them.  Now,  with  global  growth  decreasing  or
disappearing  altogether,  it  cannot  continue  growing  and  expanding.  The  production  of
education in masses unknown before – a large part thereof in the humanities – cannot be
sustained as it is based on borrowing and debts meant to be ‘paid off’ sometime in the future.
The sheer joy of the humanities is a great thing; alas, it does not pay off in any practical way
in the material world, whose margins are once again becoming narrower. 
The United States of America provide an extreme yet telling example with regard to the
phenomenon in general.  During the first half of 2019, the debts of 44 million current and
former students in the U.S. alone were estimated around 1.5 trillion USD, making every U.S.
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university  graduate  begin  his/her  early-career  life  with  a  debt  of  around 35,000 USD on
average (Friedman 2019). Students with a strong economic background probably owe much
less; one may therefore assume that many former students carry much bigger loans they have
to pay. Indeed, about 11% (around 166 billion USD) of these debts are in  some kind of
service failure (Tanzi 2019). Nowadays, some college students actually go hungry in order to
pay their  tuition fees and other living expenses (Laterman 2019). Other countries may be
presenting less staggering figures, but the tendency is similar worldwide; in the European
Union,  student  debt  may be public  rather  than  private  but  is  debt  all  the same.  Can this
situation continue as it is, given the fact that the resources available to sustain our modern
society are dwindling?
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion: What next? 
Humanity has entered an age of crisis, and our only way out is to think more deeply about the
global connections between politics and ecology. Human history has always been part of all
the other lives on Earth and there is no way for us to escape from that common fate (Hou
2018). The humanities are not dissociated from human lives, so this applies to the humanities
as well: engaging in the humanities means freedom from catering for one’s basic needs and
most  of  our  freedoms  so  far  have  been  energy-intensive,  from  the  time  of  the  early
civilisations  on  Earth  (Chakrabarty  2009).  The more  energy provided,  the  more  freedom
humans enjoyed; in our case, the free scholar who has someone or something else take care of
his/her supply of material. What should we expect now, when the amount of energy available
to us is not growing anymore? Should we expect less freedom and hence a lower ability to
engage ourselves in the humanities, now that the ‘newʼ energy regime is about to go into a
deep change?
Problematically,  the current public  discourse and debates  on energy tend to approach
fossil  fuels  as  a  problem of  greenhouse  gas  (GHG) emissions,  with  its  direct  impact  on
climate change and all the calamities that derive from it. Indeed, GHG emissions are a dire
problem and an immediate threat to us all. However, ‘the problem’ of fossil fuels is much
more than climate change and should not be limited to emissions or pollution. When we look
at it on a wide scope, climate change is but one symptom of a larger systemic problem of the
global political economy of extraction and combustion (Princen et al. 2015, pp. 5-6). Fossil
fuels have deeply changed human society in every possible aspect and in every field of life:
our food, our mobility, our ability to produce and consume goods, our time management, our
spatial perception, our health and life expectancy, our social interactions and family relations,
our education systems and political structures, our communication, our span of attention, and
even our imagination. In short: it changed our life. And it is not sustainable – or even durable
– in any way. It will have to come to an end. 
What can we do with this? Where can we take the humanities to now, from the dire
energy straits in which they are, together with the rest of humanity’s modern endeavour? In
order to find some reasonable answers to these questions, we first have to distinguish between
four  related  yet  distinct  issues.  It  may well  be that  at  least  part  of  the confusion we are
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experiencing and the feeling of anxiety and lack of orientation prevalent among humanists (as
well as others) is due to the confusion between these issues. The first issue is defining and
acknowledging the problem of modern scholarship – the humanities included – in relation to
energy resources. The second issue is admitting what is not likely to happen and what is not
reasonable to expect. The third issue – standing in contradiction to the second – is what may
be possible to achieve. The fourth issue is what is desired and what we wish for, under the
given conditions. While the first three issues are positivist by nature – even if not precise, and
subject to different assessments and interpretations – the last one is normative. 
First, the root of the problem of modern scholarship in general and the humanities in
particular in relation to energy resources is basically the problem facing the entire modern
civilisation: the declining availability of easy-to-get, accessible energy. The combination of a
growing  population  and the  diminishing  returns  on  energetic  investments  led  us  all  to  a
situation in which more and more people have to share a pie which is not growing anymore
and may soon be shrinking. This is even before we begin to deal with the environmental
damages caused by the burning of fossil fuels and the socio-political havoc these are already
causing through climate change and the mass destruction of habitats and livelihoods (Princen
2014; Tollefson 2016). One more thing we must remember in this context is that clean energy
from renewable sources is not likely to fill the gap between current energy demand and future
energy supply. We currently have no technology that would sufficiently substitute fossil fuels
in all their usages and in the quantities currently combusted. 
Therefore,  some  things  are  not likely  to  happen  and  are  not reasonable  to  expect.
Foremost among these is the flawless continuation of the 20th century’s norm of drilling,
pumping, and burning, while creating an imagined and unsustainable ‘growth’ on the one
hand and turning the Earth’s atmosphere into a huge greenhouse on the other. This ‘business
as usual’ situation is likely to stop sooner or later both because of the environmental damages
it  causes  and because  of  the  exhaustion  of  the  reserves  of  petroleum,  the  main  resource
enabling it (although one should not hope for the latter to stop the former, as there are still
enough fossils to be burned in order to destroy our biosphere three times over; Princen 2014).
As a consequence,  we may suspect that processes which have become a norm during the
fossil fuel era – growth, specialisation, centralisation – will also come to a halt. Nonetheless,
given  the  scientific  and  technological  knowledge  accumulated,  tested,  and  implemented
during the past centuries, we may well assume that we are not going back to the Stone Age or
the ‘Olduvai Gorge’ (Duncan 2007): humanity has made enough technological progress from
the Stone Age to early modern times and complex societies have existed for millennia without
fossil  fuels.  Dystopian  visions  of  our  modern  global  human  society  dismembering  into
thousands  of  detached,  naked  cave-dwelling  tribes  of  nomads  provide  the  base  for  an
interesting literary experience but will probably prove to be exaggerated in reality. 
What might be possible to achieve, therefore, is a new social,  political,  and economic
order (in this case all three words are synonyms), which will not be based on growth and will
not take growth as one of its components. The transition to such a new order will require a
rearrangement of all aspects of our lives, a re-planning, descaling, and probably decentralising
of  our  current  institutions.  History does  not  repeat  itself,  but  it  may rhyme:  we do have
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historical precedents and examples of societies which survived, thrived, and even flourished
without economic growth. Growth is a new phenomenon, and although the forces that try to
make us forget the past (or at  least  blur it)  are considerably strong, it  is  not  beyond our
capacity to look back into history and find plenty of examples and lessons. As a matter of fact,
all pre-industrial economies lived in a relatively steady situation, with no or only negligible
growth.  To  achieve  this,  we  shall  definitely  need  the  humanities  (history,  literature,
linguistics, archaeology): to look into our pre-industrial history as humans and imagine a post-
industrial society. Looking at our human ancestors may teach us how can we live without
fossil fuels, while using our imagination and language skills may assist us in inventing new,
updated, and suitable systems and tools for living like that anew in the future. 
What future exactly? The answer to this question is not positivist but rather normative. It
is not the question of what we can, but of what we want and desire. After finding and learning
a set (or a spectrum) of possibilities, we will have to redraw the outlines of a new global
human  society,  based  on  renewable  energy  sources.  The  reorganisation  of  our  lives  will
demand  a  deep  and  thorough  redistribution  of  wealth  and  labour,  as  well  as  changes  in
occupations, family ties, and political regimes. Do we want higher or lower inequality? Do we
want more openness or more seclusion? Do we wish for more connections or would we prefer
breaking into more isolated social units? Whether we define the current situation within the
humanities  as  a  crisis  or  as  a  set  of  problems  (Donoghue  2010;  Nussbaum  2016),  the
humanities themselves – like all other parts of life and society – will have to break from the
frames and the institutions to which they were bound during the industrial era. 
The good news, however, is that the humanities – while having to reorganize and adapt to
an era of  relative  scarcity  and decrease  – may help us make wise decisions.  The current
energetic predicament of modern society is made of natural factors – resources and emissions
– but is entirely human-made. Both at  its  extraction end, with declining returns from our
current energy sources, and at its emission end, with pollution and climate change threatening
billions of people around the world, our modern energy economy was and still is planned,
built, and maintained by humans. As our entire economy, our current energy regime is based
neither on divine ruling nor some natural law; it is a social construct. Therefore, it is up to us,
humans, to change and improve it, or – as seems to be the case here – abandon it and develop
a new one to replace it. A primary precondition for good decision making is a clear view of
reality. Studying, mapping, and analysing human ideas, thoughts and actions is exactly the
mandate of the humanities. Energy humanities, then, can and should play a central role in
learning  from  our  past  human  experience,  analysing  our  present  human  situation,  and
envisioning a novel energy regime in which humans may think and act in the future. 
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